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OBSTACLES TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
 COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
♣
 
 Laura Gómez Mera
 ♦
 
Introduction  
The 1990s saw a resurgence of regional trade initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC). Triggered by security, political and economic motivations, these schemes were initially 
viewed as positive developments. In particular, analysts emphasized the differences between this 
new wave of “open” regionalism and the inward-oriented regional integration projects of the 
1950s and 1960s (Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2001). Yet a closer look suggests that the 
performance of many of these agreements has been far from impressive. Progress on tariff cuts 
has been slow and the implementation of signed treaties, uneven. The failure of many LAC 
countries to follow through on the commitments they undertake at the regional level undermines 
the economic and political sustainability of these organizations, ultimately compromising their 
underlying objectives.  
  Scholars frequently acknowledge the existence of serious commitment problems in LAC 
regional organizations (Devlin and French-Davis, 1998; Bouzas, 2001; Duran and Maldonado, 
2005; etc.). Yet, there have been few attempts to systematically measure and take stock of the 
implementation and compliance deficit in these blocs. This paper seeks to contribute to the 
literature on regional integration in LAC, by presenting and analyzing original data on the 
compliance and implementation records of members of the four main blocs in the region, namely, 
the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community (CAN), the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The empirical 
evidence presented in this paper suggests that there are indeed commitment problems in the four 
organizations. It also shows that there are variations both across and within the four agreements.  
  The paper draws on International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy 
(IPE) theoretical perspectives to account for these variations. It argues that the two main 
perspectives in the debate on compliance with international agreements, the enforcement and 
management approaches, are useful to account for patterns of cross-national implementation and 
compliance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet, the tendency of these approaches to neglect 
the role of external influences could prove misleading when examining implementation and 
compliance gaps in regional trade agreements among developing countries. The paper thus argues 
that greater attention needs to be paid to external constraints, and in particular, to the role of 
globalization. The empirical findings presented here suggest that international interdependence 
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  3and vulnerability have had an impact on the ability and willingness of LAC countries to honor 
their regional commitments.   
  The paper is structured as follows. The next section begins with a general discussion of 
the concepts of commitment, compliance and implementation in the IR literature, and then 
presents the main theoretical perspectives on the sources of non-compliance with international 
agreements. The third section assesses whether such problems are in fact present in LAC regional 
agreements by examining different indicators of compliance and implementation. It then 
examines the sources of commitment problems in LAC regional organizations, focusing 
specifically on the determinants of practical implementation. The final section summarizes the 
main empirical results and their theoretical implications and discusses avenues for future 
research.  
Theoretical Framework 
Conceptualizing Commitment, Compliance and Implementation  
Neoliberal institutionalist scholars have emphasized the role of international institutions in 
helping self-interested states to achieve and sustain cooperation in an anarchic international 
setting. Yet the effectiveness of institutions in promoting cooperation remains contingent on 
member states’ commitment to undertaking and observing the institution’s norms, rules and 
regulations.  In this paper, commitment is viewed as encompassing the two interrelated but 
distinct notions of implementation and compliance. Following Underdal (1998: 26), I define 
implementation as “the measures that governments take to translate international accords into 
domestic law and policy” and compliance as the extent to which they adhere to the provisions of 
these agreements. A further distinction can be made between legal and practical implementation. 
According to Tallberg (2002), the former refers to the “measures that states take to make 
international accords effective in their domestic law,” and the latter to the practical steps they take 
to adjust their behavior to these accords. In this sense, and consistent with Young (1979) and 
Simmons (1998), implementation entails the practical and legal adoption of treaty regulations that 
are expected to facilitate and promote compliance.  
  Three additional considerations are relevant when discussing compliance and 
implementation in regional trade organizations. First, the two concepts are independent of the 
notion of regime effectiveness, which tends to refer to the extent to which an organization is able 
to achieve its stated or implicit objectives (Simmons, 1998; Underdal, 1998). This is useful to 
understand the survival of some economically irrelevant regional organizations in the developing 
world. Some customs unions among developing countries, for example, are created with the 
ultimate (but perhaps implicit) goal of increasing member states’ leverage in multilateral trade 
negotiations. In such cases, compliance and implementation problems may not necessarily 
undermine their underlying strategic rationale. At the other extreme, a regional trade agreement 
created mainly to promote trade among partners could generate high levels of compliance and 
implementation but fail to significantly expand intra-bloc interdependence for a number of 
reasons (e.g. small market size, lack of complementarity among partners’ economic structures, 
unfavorable external or domestic circumstances). Ultimately, we would expect commitment 
problems to work to undermine regime effectiveness (Young, 1992). Yet, this paper focuses on 
the former and does not directly address the latter.  
  Second, scholars tend to differentiate between “first” and “second order” compliance. 
First-order compliance implies adherence to original or standing rules and treaties signed by 
states. In contrast, the concept of “second order” compliance is typically used to refer to 
compliance with legally binding decisions taken by a third-party, usually in response to a case of 
first order non-compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). The advantage of focusing on second-
order compliance, which has been frequent in research on the GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
  4mechanism, is that it is easier to empirically establish the “rate of compliance” (Simmons, 1998). 
In this paper, however, I focus on first-order compliance.  
  Finally, as Underdal (1998: 6) points out, both implementation and compliance are 
matters of degree-- “an actor may comply with some provisions but not with others, and meet 
some obligations partially.
 1 In the context of a customs union, for example, member states may 
observe their commitments to eliminate all barriers to intra-bloc trade, but might fail to 
implement common external tariff agreements (CET), maintaining different levels of tariffs on 
third parties’ products. Similarly, a country might adjust its external trade policy to implement the 
CET in all but a number of sectors or product lines. This understanding of compliance and 
implementation in degrees of intensity has important methodological implications. Drawing on 
these insights, Figure 1 summarizes the concepts of implementation, compliance and commitment 
that will be used in the rest of the paper. The table distinguishes between the process of policy 
and/or norm formulation and the subsequent ability of states to commit themselves to that policy. 
The notion of commitment is viewed as including both the ability and/or willingness of a state to 
implement and to comply with it after implementing it. A further distinction is made between 
“legal” and “practical” implementation.  
 
 
FIGURE 1: The Different Dimensions of Commitment to Regional Policy and Agreements 
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The Sources of Commitment Problems  
Two main perspectives can be identified in the debate on the sources of compliance with 
international agreements: the enforcement and the management approaches (Chayes and Chayes, 
1995; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996). These two approaches diverge on what determines 
and on how to address problems of non-compliance and implementation.  
Enforcement scholars assume that states are rational actors whose compliance and 
implementation decisions depend on the structure of material incentives that they face. This is 
consistent with traditional IR perspectives on cooperation, and particularly with the realist view 
that international institutions are “epiphenomenal” and that states are cynical when joining them, 
  5knowing that they might subsequently decide to renege on their rules. In Tallberg’s (2002: 611) 
words, “states’ interests may include signature but not compliance.” From this perspective, non-
compliance can only be deterred through effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  
The enforcement approach assumes that both systemic and domestic level factors could alter the 
structure of incentives at a particular time, leading states to shirk on their commitments (Downs, 
Rocke and Barzoom, 1996). Consistent with power politics approaches, one group of scholars 
argues that powerful states tend to be less sensitive to changes in the structure of material 
incentives (Borzel et. al., 2006). According to the power preponderance hypothesis, therefore, 
economically and politically strong states are less likely to comply with and to implement 
international agreements. In contrast, others argue that stronger states are able to exercise their 
power at the decision-making and negotiating stages, so that only those agreements that reflect 
their preferences will emerge. Powerful states are thus expected to exhibit higher levels of 
compliance and implementation. Moreover, and consistent with hegemonic stability theory, 
regional hegemons can act to provide centralized mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning 
defection, thus leading to higher levels of compliance and implementation within the organization 
(Mattli, 1999). 
Neoliberal institutionalist insights on cooperation are also consistent with enforcement 
approaches to compliance. Like realists, neoliberals focus on material incentives for compliance 
and implementation, but they emphasize the role of institutional mechanisms in promoting and 
facilitating compliant behavior (Keohane, 1984). Institutions work to provide information and 
increase transparency, reducing uncertainty about partners’ behavior and underlining the 
reputational consequences of uncooperative behavior. Crucially, institutions provide monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms that increase the costs of defection. Drawing on this perspective, 
Smith (2000: 2) has argued that more legalized dispute settlement mechanisms are expected to 
improve compliance rates “by increasing the costs of opportunism.” 
A third set of arguments, also consistent with the rationalist underpinning of enforcement 
approaches, emphasizes instead the role of domestic level variables. Several studies have 
examined the links between regime type and compliant behavior. Two contending hypotheses 
have emerged from this literature. The first predicts a positive relationship between democracy 
and compliance and implementation, emphasizing two main causal mechanisms. According to the 
“democratic legalist” argument, liberal democratic regimes tend to be more willing to observe 
and respect international law because of their commitment to the rule of law and to legal 
institutions (Simmons, 2000). Other scholars point instead to the importance of domestic public 
opinion and “audience costs” in deterring non-compliant behavior in democracies. In this view, 
democratic leaders who renege on international commitments may face negative electoral 
consequences and will thus face stronger incentives to comply than autocrats (Fearon, 1994; 
Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002).  
An alternative view highlights the domestic distributional implications of international 
agreements, challenging the contention that domestic pressures always deter non-compliance. 
Because those groups that are harmed by international commitments will lobby their governments 
for non-compliance, democratic leaders might face simultaneous pressures for and against 
compliance. Ultimately, whether a democratic state chooses to comply or not will depend on the 
balance of power among these domestic groups (Tomz, 2002; 2003). This argument is 
particularly relevant when studying commitment problems in regional trade agreements, which 
have clear distributional consequences at the domestic level.
2  
In contrast to the enforcement perspective, the management approach assumes that states 
in general do (or at least want to) comply with their international obligations (Chayes and Chayes, 
1995; Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell, 1998). Non-compliance, according to this perspective, is 
involuntary. States do not comply because they are constrained either by norm ambiguity 
(vagueness and uncertainty in treaty wording, inadequate time tables, etc.) or by capacity 
limitations. In some cases, lack of information constrains the ability of states to come through on 
  6their commitments. Non-compliance may thus be “inadvertent” (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). As a 
result, for management scholars problems of non-compliance and non-implementation can only 
be addressed through capacity-building, more flexible time-tables, and greater rule specification. 
International institutions play an important role in this respect, not in providing enforcement and 
sanctioning mechanisms as enforcement scholars would expect, but in promoting capacity 
building and disseminating information.  
Two types of state capacity problems can hinder compliance and implementation: 
administrative and political limitations. Small states, for example, might be constrained by 
inadequate financial and human resources and technical capacity limitations in their attempts to 
implement certain types of international agreements (Borzel et. al. 2006). Macroeconomic 
conditions might also indirectly affect the administrative capacity of a state and hence influence 
its international behavior (Tallberg, 2002). Other management scholars emphasize the role of 
political capacity and autonomy, arguing that the number of domestic level actors that are able to 
block political decisions (i.e. veto players) affects the extent to which a state is able to observe 
international commitments. The main theoretical expectation is that a higher number of veto 
players decreases the likelihood of compliance and implementation.
3  
 
 
FIGURE 2: Summary of Hypotheses*  
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  7problem with these explanations, however, is that they tend to neglect the role of exogenous (or 
extra-agreement) influences, such as global economic forces and extra-regional power 
asymmetries. This may not be too consequential when examining the sources of non-compliance 
in international agreements among developed countries (like the EU, for example). But it could 
be quite misleading when looking at agreements among developing countries, which tend to be 
significantly more vulnerable to external forces. Here it is useful to incorporate insights from the 
IPE literature on regional cooperation, and in particular, from the “new regionalism” approach 
(Breslin et. al., 2003; Söderbaum, 2003; Soderbaum and Hettne, 2005; etc). This work underlines 
the important and multifaceted interconnections between globalization and regionalism. 
According to this body of literature, globalization promotes regionalism among developing 
countries through a number of causal mechanisms.
4  
While highly illuminating, this literature suffers from two main weaknesses. First, these 
arguments neglect the possibility that increased economic interdependence and global power 
asymmetries might, under certain conditions, work to hinder (not promote) compliance and 
implementation. These scholars view regionalism as either a reaction against or an instrument of 
US-led “neoliberal globalization.” They overlook the fact that many developing countries, 
particularly in the Americas, have had a positive reaction to the more recent US strategy of 
aggressively pursuing bilateral free trade agreements in the region (Schott, 2004; Zoellick, 
2007).
5 While in the case of MERCOSUR, US bilateralism has created further defensive 
incentives for regional cooperation, in other cases it has had the opposite effect. According to 
Phillips (2005: 21), for example, US bilateralism has “worked to undermine the cohesion of sub-
regional groupings” in LAC. This is nowhere as clear as in the case of the Andean Community. In 
April 2006, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez decided to exit the bloc, accusing partners 
Colombia and Peru of “killing” the Community, after completing FTAs with the US.
6
In addition, the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral agreements in LAC, not only 
with the US but with other countries within and outside the Western Hemisphere, has practical 
implications in terms of compliance and implementation. In line with the “spaghetti bowl” 
argument (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996), the proliferation of overlapping agreements increases 
the administrative costs of compliance and implementation. It could also lead to confusion about 
implementation. Several analysts have, for example, referred to the uncertainties created by the 
DR-CAFTA and its interaction with pre-existing CACM agreements and regulations in Central 
America (Granados and Cornejo, 2006; Gonzalez, 2005).
7 Overlapping and “crisscrossing” 
agreements also have a clear impact in LAC states willingness and ability to implement CET 
agreements. In the 1990s, the Menem’s government attempts to have Argentina sign a bilateral 
agreement with the US almost resulted in the downgrading of MERCOSUR to a FTA (Gómez 
Mera, 2005b). More recently, according to INTAL (2002), negotiations with third parties have 
worked to divert CACM members’ attention and to hinder progress towards the implementation 
of the CET.  
A second shortcoming of the new regionalism literature lies in its lack of attention to the 
impact of trade and financial vulnerability on states’ ability and willingness to observe regional 
commitments. Here it might also be useful to differentiate between the distinct effects of trade 
and financial interdependence. The literature on financial globalization has highlighted the 
important constraints that capital mobility places on developing countries’ policy autonomy 
(Andrews, 1994; Cohen, 2000; Haggard and Maxfield, 1996). Several empirical studies, on the 
other hand, have documented the complex impact of global financial pressures on regional trade 
cooperation. Bowles (2002), for example, examines the impact of the Asian Crises on regional 
cooperation in East Asia and in South America. Both ASEAN and MERCOSUR were severely 
affected by the capital outflows that hit the two regions in the late 1990s.  
In South America, capital outflows in the late 1990s exacerbated balance of payments 
problems increasing the costs of observing regional trade commitments. For Brazilian and 
Argentine policy-makers, protectionist measures were an attempt to moderate balance of 
  8payments deficits. The recessionary and macroeconomic effects of the financial crises also 
worked to exacerbate distributional tension at the domestic level, leading to a protectionist 
backlash against regional integration both in MERCOSUR and ASEAN (Solingen, 2001; Gómez 
Mera, 2005a). In addition, as Phillips and Higgott (1999) have noted, the crisis of confidence that 
hit emerging markets in the late 1990s created tension within blocs, as members sought to 
“differentiate” themselves from their troubled partners. This suggests that it might be worth 
examining and comparing the effects of both trade and financial openness and vulnerability when 
examining the sources of commitment problems in RTAs.  
 
Commitment Problems in LAC Regional Organizations 
 
There have been few attempts to systematically measure and take stock of the problems of 
implementation and compliance in LAC regional organizations. To a great extent, this reflects the 
scarcity of reliable and consistent data on LAC countries’ compliance and implementation 
records. Here the contrast with the European Union (EU) is daunting. EU scholars benefit from 
the wide availability of information on member-states’ infringements, which has facilitated the 
emergence of a rich body of quantitative and qualitative research on the sources of commitment 
problems among European countries (Borzel et. al. 2006; Tallberg, 2002; Sverdrup, 2004; 
Falkner et. al., 2004; etc.). This data is collected and periodically released by the European 
Commission, as part of its monitoring activities. In contrast, not all regional organizations in LAC 
have supranational bodies that provide centralized systems of enforcement and/or that 
systematically collect and disseminate information on infringements and implementation 
failures.
8 A related problem derives from the fact that different blocs rely on different 
enforcement mechanisms and thus, when available, the information on non-compliance tends to 
be uneven and not easily comparable across blocs.
9 As a result, it is difficult to measure and 
compare the record of commitment of LAC countries across blocs.  
  The information provided by each regional organization could, under certain conditions, 
be used to examine patterns of compliance and implementation within these trade organizations. 
This could serve as a starting point for analyzing broader patterns of commitment with trade 
agreements in the region. As a proxy of non-compliance, I use the average number of formal 
complaints (presented by either partners or by the regional bodies) against each country in 
MERCOSUR, CAN, CACM and CARICOM.
10 This information is summarized in Figure 3.  
 
 
FIGURE 3: Average Number of Violations in LAC Blocs, 1998-2005 
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Figure 3 would, at first glance, suggest that there is significant variation across and within blocs 
in terms of compliance. It shows that countries like Guatemala, Argentina, Ecuador and Colombia 
exhibit poor records of compliance, while their partners Costa Rica, Paraguay and Bolivia 
(respectively) fare much better. This suggests that there might be a negative relationship between 
size and compliance, although this hypothesis would be rejected if we look at the case Uruguay in 
MERCOSUR. Comparing the standard deviations of the average violations for each bloc, it 
emerges that the extent of intra-agreement variation in terms of compliance occurs in CACM 
(1.55) and the lower in CARICOM (0.35). 
  Nevertheless, there are good reasons to challenge the validity and reliability of this 
indicator (formal complaints presented at the bloc’s dispute settlement fora), to measure non-
compliance. First of all, it excludes the cases of undetected and unreported non-compliance or 
those that are successfully managed directly between the aggressor and the affected partners. 
Partners and/or regional bodies might fail to detect a violation, or they might choose not to 
formally report it. Second, in the case of MERCOSUR, for example, it is mainly partners who 
present formal complaints to the Common Market Group. The validity of the indicator could thus 
be affected if some partners exhibit a greater tendency to present complaints than others. 
Alternatively, regional bodies may be biased towards or against some partners. Third, given that 
LAC blocs tend to be characterized by significant exemptions among partners, the number of 
complaints does not take into account the fact that those partners who benefit from a larger 
number of exemptions might have a lower need to violate regional agreements.
11  
  It is even more challenging to measure and compare practical implementation levels 
within and across blocs.
12 Several attempts have been made by regional integration scholars to 
design indicators of the “success” and depth of integration (e.g. Hufbauer and Schott, 1994; Feng 
and Genna, 2005; Ruiz, 2004).
13 However few of these have focused on the issue of 
implementation. One exception is Haftel (2007), who creates an index of economic scope and 
implementation that first considers the stated depth of integration of different agreements and 
then assesses the extent to which these are implemented. This index, however, uses the regional 
 10organization as the unit of analysis, assuming that all countries within the bloc implement 
agreements to the same extent. This is a questionable assumption. 
  In order to make more reliable comparisons across countries in terms of implementation, 
I create a composite index or “Implementation Achievement Score” (IAS), which assesses a state 
record in undertakings its regional commitments in three main areas: (1) the customs union 
(implementation of the common external tariff); (2) the internal market (removal of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade of goods and services); and (3) macroeconomic 
convergence (the extent to which it has been able to reach the agreed convergence targets). I use 
an ordinal scale of 0 (no implementation at all) to 4 (complete implementation) for the first two of 
these components and a scale of 1 to 3 for the latter.
14 Perfect compliance would result in an IAS 
of 11 points. To code the achievement of each state (to the year 2005), I rely on progress reports 
published both by individual governments and by the regional organization, independent 
evaluation reports by international organizations, such as ECLAC and the IADB, as well as 
newspaper reports and other qualitative assessments by integration experts.
15  
  The results are summarized in Figure 4. The latter shows that there are significant 
variations across LAC countries in terms of the implementation of regional commitments (See 
also Table A1 in Appendix). It also suggests that overall levels of implementation are not 
particularly high within the region. The average implementation score for the year 2005 was 6.42. 
In fact, no country was given the top score for (11 points), with top performer Trinidad and 
Tobago obtaining just 9 points. The distribution of the IAS scores seems to cluster around the 
average value, with no cases under 4 or above 9 points. 
  Figure 4 also shows that the top performers in terms of compliance are not necessarily the 
best in terms of practical implementation. Patterns of implementation seem not to be too 
consistently related to size, in contrast to what enforcement scholars would predict. Figure 5, in 
turn, suggests that there are also important variations within each bloc. The greater variance 
happens in CAN, where Colombia has been quite committed to implementing its agreements, and 
smaller partners Peru and Bolivia have received special treatment since the bloc’s inauguration. 
In contrast, in MERCOSUR partners exhibit consistently low levels of implementation of 
regional agreements. 
If the average IAS is calculated for each bloc (See Figure A2 in the Appendix), we find 
that MERCOSUR is the worst performer with an average score of 5, and CACM is the leader 
with a score of 6.8. However, the differences among CACM and CARICOM (6.6) are very small. 
Figure A2 (See Appendix) in fact shows that there are not dramatic differences in overall 
performance among LAC blocs. It would be more interesting, however, to compare the 
implementation record of LAC agreements with other integration schemes among developing 
countries.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Implementation Achievement Score, 2005 
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              FIGURE 5: Implementation Achievement Score for the main LAC Blocs 
 
MERCOSUR CACM CAN CARICOM 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
 
 12  
 
Explaining Commitment Problems in LAC Agreements 
 
How relevant are the theoretical approaches discussed earlier, typically used to explain 
implementation and compliance problems in the EU, when trying to account for the sources of 
these problems in LAC trade agreements? Statistical analysis can be used to test empirically the 
hypotheses derived from the enforcement and management approaches. This analysis uses the 
state as the unit of analysis, which results in a dataset of 26 observations. Given the small number 
of observations, ordinary least squares (OLS) is used. Given the suspect validity of the number of 
reported complaints as an indicator of compliance, the discussion here focuses on practical 
implementation, as proxy for commitment. The dependent variable for this analysis is thus the 
IAS, measured as the progress in practically implementing regional commitments (intra-bloc 
liberalization of trade in goods and services, adoption of the CET and macroeconomic 
convergence) up to 2005.  
  The independent variables, their operationalization, and the data sources used in their 
measurement are summarized in Table 1. To test the general enforcement hypothesis that states 
will be more likely to implement and comply with agreements when the benefits of participating 
outweigh the benefits of non-compliance, I use the variable TRADE DEPENDENCE, measured 
in terms of export reliance on the regional market (exports to the bloc as a proportion of total 
exports).
16 I expect that the more dependent a state is on the bloc for placing its exports, the more 
committed it will be to implementing agreements. To test the realist hypothesis on the effects of 
POWER on compliance and implementation, I use real GDP as a proxy for economic power.
17 To 
test whether being a “regional hegemon” affects states’ implementation behavior, I use a dummy 
variable (HEGEMONY) that is 1 if the country is considerably larger than its partners.
18 
Domestic level hypotheses on the role of democracy are tested using the Freedom House index of 
political rights
  (FREEDOM)
19 and the   RULE OF LAW indicator from the World Bank’s 
governance indicators (WBI).
20 WBI Indicators are also used to test propositions derived from 
the management approach. GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS seeks to capture the 
administrative, financial and technical capacity of the state.
21  
Finally, a number of variables are used to test the globalization and external influences 
hypotheses. I use two indicators to measure external vulnerability: OPENNESS, measured as 
exports and imports as a proportion of GDP and as current account as a percentage of GDP. To 
capture the impact of financial globalization and vulnerability to capital flows I use 
INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, measured as the value of all foreign loans and bonds.
22 The 
hypothesis linking the number of free trade agreements that each country has signed and its 
ability and incentives to implement previous regional commitments is tested with the variable 
FTA (the number of free trade agreements with LAC and third countries completed to December 
2005). The US dummy variable is 1 if the country has an agreement with the US.  
 
 
TABLE 1: Summary of Hypotheses, Variables and Data Sources 
 
 
Theoretical Approach 
 
Variable 
 
Measure 
 
Source 
 
1. Enforcement 
 
 
Trade dependence 
 
Intra-bloc X/Total X 
 
BADECEL, 
WDI 
 
 
Power  preponderance  GDP (constant 2000 
US$) 
WDI 
 
  Power asymmetry  Hegemony (dummy)   
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  Democracy  Rule of Law  WBI 
 
2. Management 
 
 
State capacity 
 
Gov. effectiveness  
 
Regulatory quality 
 
WBI 
 
 
 
3. Globalization &  
     Vulnerability 
 
 
Trade openness 
 
Current account 
 
Financial vulnerability. 
 
Proliferation of PTAs 
 
 
 
Exports + Imports/GDP 
 
CA/GDP 
 
International Loans + 
Bonds 
 
N. of PTAs signed to 
2005 
 
 
BADECEL, 
WDI  
 
WDI 
 
WDI 
 
WTO 
 
 
FTA w/US (dummy) 
 
 
Results are reported in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 test the two conventional approaches, 
enforcement and management. Models 3-5 add the globalization and vulnerability variables to 
test the claim that globalization affects implementation levels. The empirical results suggest, first 
of all, that there is not a significant relationship between economic power and implementation 
achievements. POWER, operationalized as GDP is not significant in models 1 and 2. These 
results challenge neorealist-inspired hypotheses on power preponderance and commitment to 
international agreements. By contrast, the dummy variable HEGEMONY is significant in all 
specifications of the model, suggesting that regional hegemons tend to be more committed than 
their weaker partners.
23 Controlling for other factors, being a regional hegemon improves the 
implementation score in about 1.8 points (Model 4). 
  Second, and consistent with the enforcement approach, the empirical analysis shows that 
there is a positive relationship between TRADE DEPENDENCE and implementation 
achievement. This suggests that the greater the export reliance of a state on the regional market, 
and thus the greater the expected benefits of being a member of the bloc, the greater a member 
state’s commitment to implementing regional agreements. The substantive impact of this variable 
on the index of implementation is nevertheless quite small: a 1% increase in trade dependence 
results in an increase of less than 0.04 in the implementation achievement score.  
  Third, the findings presented in Table 3 challenge conventional expectations on the role 
of domestic level variables, such as regime type and state capacity on implementation of regional 
agreements. RULE OF LAW was not found to have a significant impact on the dependent 
variable, when controlling for other systemic and domestic level factors (See Model 2).
24 The 
variable GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS did not appear to have a significant effect on 
implementation achievement levels, either (Models 2 and 4). These could be seen as challenging 
the management approach argument on state capacity, although it could be well argued that other 
indicators of the latter could lead to more promising results. Similar results were, however, 
obtained using REGULATORY QUALITY and, following Borzel et. al. (2006), using real GDP 
per capita.  
  Finally, the empirical analysis supports the argument presented in this paper regarding 
the importance of considering the links between globalization, vulnerability and commitment to 
regional trade agreements.  Trade openness has a positive and significant impact on 
implementation achievements, indicating that greater trade interdependence creates incentives for 
states to comply with and implement regional trade agreements. Models 3 suggests that the 
 14substantive impact of this variable might not be very important, however. Nevertheless, this result 
could be seen as providing empirical support for claims that globalization promotes regional 
cooperation. The variable PTA, on the other hand, is statistically significant and substantive in 
models 4 and 5. However, the coefficient of PTA does not have the expected sign. The results 
obtained would suggest that the greater the number of agreements a country has signed, the more 
committed it is to its original bloc. This would challenge claims that the proliferation of 
overlapping agreements acts to divert governments’ attention and create information and capacity 
problems. Instead, the empirical findings suggest that multiple membership in agreements of 
different scopes could work to increase capacity of implementation, for example. This result 
could also be interpreted as suggesting that increased participation in preferential trade 
agreements leads to an improvement of competitiveness and hence pro-integration stance of 
export-oriented sectors. International borrowing, on the other hand, seems to have a negative 
impact on implementation achievement. However, this variable does not seem to have a 
significant impact on the dependent variable. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has focused on compliance and implementation gaps in the four main regional 
organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely, CACM, CAN, MERCOSUR and 
CARICOM. While frequently acknowledged, the extent and sources of these commitment 
problems have been under-examined. The paper seeks to take a step in that direction by applying 
insights from the International Relations literature, and in particular, from work on the EU. While 
the results presented are preliminary and the measurement and coding strategies need further 
refinement, the purpose is to highlight the importance of studying these issues systematically and 
to suggest ways in which to do this. 
  The paper begins by clarifying the distinction between the concepts of implementation 
and compliance and the different indicators that can be used to measure each of these. 
Preliminary data on reported complaints against member states at the regional administrative and 
dispute settlement bodies is presented. This data suggests that there are significant variations in 
within-bloc compliance levels. To measure implementation, the paper uses an Implementation 
Achievement Score, which assesses the progress made by each country in the LAC region 
towards meeting their regional trade commitments. The examination of this indicator across a 
sample of LAC countries suggests that overall levels of implementation are q low. Although there 
are not significant differences in the average levels of the IAS across blocs, there are marked 
differences within each bloc. 
    To account for these cross-national differences, the paper performs a preliminary 
empirical analysis that tests the explanatory power of competing hypotheses derived from 
International Relations theoretical debates on compliance. The results suggest that, consistent 
with enforcement perspectives, trade dependence on the regional market and regional hegemony 
are important explanatory variables for predicting implementation achievements. By contrast, 
limited empirical support is found for hypotheses linking regime type and state capacity with 
implementation. Given that the observation of the distribution of the IAS score across countries 
suggests that smaller states have had greater problems implementing agreements, this result could 
change if an alternative proxy for state capacity is used.  
Most importantly, the empirical findings confirm the importance of considering 
exogenous factors in the examination of implementation and compliance in international 
agreements among developing countries. Both external vulnerability and the number of PTAs 
signed by a LAC country appear to have a significant effect on its implementation record. Further 
research will focus not only on refining the measurement and operationalization of the dependent 
and independent variables but also on incorporating the temporal dimension to the cross-national 
analysis presented here. Ultimately, however, and given the inherent inter-linkages between many 
 15of the explanatory factors considered here, there are limits to a quantitative approach to the 
problem of compliance and implementation. A qualitative examination of the mechanisms 
through which global economic forces and external power asymmetries interact with domestic 
level variables (not only state capacity and democratic institutions but also configurations of 
domestic political institutions and interests) would greatly enhance our understanding of 
commitment problems in RTAs among developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: OLS Determinants of the Implementation Achievement Score 
 for LAC Countries, 2005 
 
  
                                  Y = IAS 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
 
TRADE 
DEPENDENCE 
 
 0.026** 
(1.931) 
 
0.029** 
      (1.934) 
 
0.036* 
(2.955) 
 
  0.036*** 
(3.035) 
 
  0.040*** 
(3.428) 
 
 
HEGEMONY 
 
 
 2.032** 
(2.741) 
 
2.205*** 
      (2.909) 
 
 1.902** 
(2.642) 
 
  1.871*** 
(3.516) 
 
  1.729*** 
(3.069) 
 
POWER 
 
-0.0000 
(-1.129)    
 
-0.000 
(1.090) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
GOV. 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
0.689 
(1.423) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.476 
(1.232) 
 
 
 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
0.730 
(1.412) 
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RULE OF LAW 
  
0.492 
(1.190) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPENNESS 
 
  
 
 
 0.032* 
(1.950) 
 
 
 
 
 
PTA 
 
     
    0.724*** 
(3.846) 
 
  1.057*** 
     (4.028) 
 
US 
 
      
-0.938 
(-1.634) 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
BORROWING 
      
0.000 
(0.673) 
 
CONSTANT 
 
   5.552*** 
       (11.130) 
 
5.512*** 
(10.961) 
 
   4.749*** 
(8.440) 
 
 1.701 
(1.609) 
 
0.570 
(0.501) 
 
Adj. R
2
 
0.26 
 
0.23 
 
0.343 
 
0.533 
 
 
0.54 
 
 
Observations 
 
26 
       
26  26  26  26 
     
 
OLS Regressions with two-tailed t-tests. T- statistics in parentheses. ***p <0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
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 20APPENDIX 
 
TABLE AI: Implementation Achievement Score 
 
 
 
 
 
FTA 
   
MC 
 
Total  CU 
MERCOSUR      5 
Argentina  2  2 1 5 
Brazil  3  2 1 6 
Uruguay  2  1 2 5 
Paraguay  2  1 1 4 
       
CACM      6.8 
Nicaragua  3  2 1 6 
El  Salvador  3  3 3 8 
Guatemala  3  3 2 8 
Honduras  2  1 1 4 
Costa  Rica  3  3 2 8 
       
CAN      6 
Bolivia  2  2 1 5 
Ecuador 2  2 2 6 
Colombia  3  3 2 8 
Venezuela  3  3 1 7 
Peru  2  0 2 4 
       
CARICOM      6.6 
Antigua 2  2 2 6 
Barbados  2  3 3 8 
Belize  1  3 2 6 
Dominica  3  2 2 7 
Grenada 2  2 2 6 
Guyana 2  3 2 7 
Jamaica 3  3 1 7 
St. Kitts & Nevis  2  1  2  5 
St.  Lucia  2  2 2 6 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 
2  3 2 7 
Suriname  1  1 3 5 
Trinidad  &  Tobago  3  3 3 9 
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1 Underdal states that, therefore, “a useful model should be able to account for a significant amount of the variance at 
the level of individual actors as well as at the level of regimes.” 
    
2 The literature on regionalism has also highlighted the role of interest groups and other societal actors both in 
pushing for regional integration and in conditioning the extent and pace of the process of integration (Milner, 1997; 
Moravcsik, 1998; Chase, 2003).  
    
3 Several European Union (EU) scholars, however, have found that countries with several veto points in fact 
decreases the average number of infringements and improves the record of legal implementation (Borzel et. al. 2004).  
    
4 Several interrelated arguments can be identified within this literature. A first body of work has implicitly and/or 
explicitly viewed regionalism as a negative manifestation of the process of global economic integration, and in 
particular, as a mechanism for facilitating the “regional hegemony” of the neoliberal ideology (Gamble and Payne, 
1996; Gill, 1999; Phillips, 2004). Other scholars within this group have instead viewed regionalism more as a deliberate 
defensive response to the economic and competitive pressures posed by economic globalisation and by the spread of 
neoliberal policies in the 1990s (Breslin and Higgott, 2000; Bowles, 2002; Phillips, 2002).  In some cases, regional 
integration is viewed as an intermediate step to full participation in the global economy—for example as an attempt to 
improve competitiveness within a protected extended market before facing global competition (Phillips, 2000). 
Alternatively, regionalism among developing countries has been viewed as a strategy to improve their market access in 
a context of “dysfunctional” multilateralism. Finally, regionalism has been interpreted as an attempt to provide 
marginalised countries with a viable alternative to the multilateral level (Mistry, 2003; Tussie, 2003). 
    
5 Admittedly, this “positive” reaction could be linked to the asymmetries of power in US-LAC countries relations 
and associated fears of marginalization.  
    
6 See BBC News, “Venezuela quits Andean Trade Bloc,” (20 April 2006). 
    
7 For a comparison of divergences in the Rules of Origins regimes in CAFTA and CACM see Granados and Cornejo 
(2006), Appendix C. For a comparison of the coverage and scope of the two agreements, see Gonzalez (2005).  
    
8 CARICOM members, for example, have only recently inaugurated the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which 
will be in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Single Market and Economy (CSME) and managing the 
bloc’s dispute settlement mechanism. The agreement establishing the CCJ was signed on February 14, 2001 by the 
governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The agreement was later signed by Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
on February 15 2003. For further information, see http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org  
    
9 For a detailed comparison of the dispute settlement mechanisms in the different blocs, see Lacarte and Granados 
(2004). 
    
10Where possible, I tried to check this information with additional reports by international organizations (in 
particular, ECLAC and the IADB) and with news reports and other official documents.  
    
11 Focusing on the case of the EU, Borzel (2000) argues that infringements (or complaints) data can be used only if it 
can be assumed that the reported cases represent a random sample of all existing cases and that there are no major 
sources of bias.  
    
12 Several EU scholars have used the transposition deficit (the rate at which member states transpose regional 
regulations to the domestic level) as a proxy for legal implementation and commitment.   
    
13 See De Lombaerde, Pietrangeli and Weeratunge (2006) for a comprehensive overview of different indicators used 
to monitor progress in regional integration initiatives. 
    
14 This scale seeks to improve on Haftel’s (2007), which only includes three quite restrictive categories.  
    
15 For the CET IAS, I use the following coding rules:  (1) IAS1=0 if no steps taken to implement the previously 
agreed on CET; (2) IAS1= 1 if CET applied to less than 50% of state’s trade and high variability in tariff levels; (3) 
IAS1=2 if CET applied to more than 50% but less than 85%; (4) IAS1=3 CET applied to over 85% of tariff lines; (5) 
IAS1= 4 full implementation.  For the internal market IAS: (1) IAS2=0 if no concrete steps have been taken to remove 
tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to intra-regional trade of goods and services; (2) IAS2=1 if the state has made very 
little progress in removing barriers to intra-regional trade (e.g. heavy reliance on non-tariff barriers, exemption lists, 
etc.); (3) IAS2=2 if state has liberalized regional trade considerably but maintains restrictions, exemption lists and 
special regimes; (4) IAS2=3 high levels of liberalization – if state has liberalized intra-regional trade almost completely 
but maintain negative lists or sectorial exemptions; (5) IAS=4 complete intra-bloc liberalization of goods and services. 
Finally, for macroeconomic convergence: (1) IAS3= 0 if state diverged from target in 10% or more; (2) IAS3=1 if state 
diverged from target in less than 10% and more than 1%; (3) IAS3=2 if state diverged from target by 1% or less; (4) 
IAS3=3 if state met (or surpassed target). I use this coding rule for each target and then average the different scores to 
obtain the final IAS3. 
    
16 Annual intra-bloc exports as a percentage of total exports. Value for each country is the five-year average (2000-
2004) of annual export dependence.  
    
17 GDP at constant 2000 US$ prices. Values are five -year average of annual GDP (2000-2004). The rest of the 
independent variables are also averaged (and lagged). 
    
18 Countries coded as hegemons are: Brazil (MERCOSUR), Colombia and Venezuela (CAN) and Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago (CARICOM). 
    
19 See http://www.freedomhouse.org 
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20 See http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. Rule of law is conceptualized as “the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
    
21Governance effectiveness is conceptualized as “the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.”  
    
22 See Leblang (1997). 
    
23 The fact that the coefficient of the variable hegemony is consistently significant (and has a positive sign), however, 
tell us nothing about the extent to which they are able to promote higher levels of implementation within their blocs. To 
study this, it would be necessary to use the regional organization as the unit of analysis and to explore the role of 
hegemony in overall levels of implementation/compliance. 
    
24 The same results were found using FREEDOM instead of RULE OF LAW.                
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